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THE RIGHT OF AN INDIVIDUAL OTHER THAN THE CRIMINALLY
ACCUSED TO PETITION FOR A PUBLIC TRIAL
Oliver v. Postel
37 App. Div. 2d 498,327 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1971)*
Prior to an extortion trial,' newspapers commented adversely on
the defendant's character and associations.2 After the trial judge
warned the press to limit their coverage of the trial,' editorials critical
of the judge's action were published.' Rejecting the prosecution's ar-
guments that other remedies, including sequestering the jury, were
more appropriate, 5 the trial judge granted the defendant's motion for
an order excluding spectators and the press and sealing the record un-
* Since the writing of this comment, the Court of Appeals of New York has
rendered its decision on an appeal from the Supreme Court, Appellate Division. Al-
though the issue was mooted by the acquittal of the criminal defendant, the court held
that Judge Postel's order was improper. The court stated, "[Tlhe record in the present
case makes it exceedingly plain that the order closing the courtroom-made upon the
defendant's application-was aimed specifically at the news media and was intended as
a punishment for what the respondent characterized as their 'contumacious conduct' in
disregarding his prior admonitions not to publish 'anything other than [what] transpires
in this courtroom."' Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, -, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407, 412, 282
N.E.2d 306, 309 (1972). The court then concluded that "[T]he respondent's order was
an unwarranted effort to punish and censor the press, and the fact that it constituted
a novel form of censorship cannot insulate or shield it from constitutional attack." Id.
at-, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 415, 282 N.E.2d at 311.
1. The trial continued behind closed doors until its conclusion, resulting in the de-
fendant's acquittal on Dec. 10, 1971. Brief of Appellant at 4, Oliver v. Postel, 37
App. Div. 2d 498, 327 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1971).
2. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1971, at 53, col. 1 (city ed.).
3. Oliver v. Postel, 37 App. Div. 2d 498, 499, 327 N.Y.S.2d 444, 446 (1971).
Judge Postel, when questioned as to the legal authority for his warning by reporters
in his chambers replied, "Postel's law." N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1971, at 42, col. 2
(city ed.).
4. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1971, at 1, cols. 2-3 (city ed.); id., Nov. 13, 1971, at
1, col. 5 (city ed.); id., Nov. 17, 1971, at 46, col. 2 (city ed.). As to the signifi-
cance of the timing of publicity prior to, as opposed to after, empanelment, see Barist,
First Amendment and Regulation of Prejudicial Publicity-An Analysis, 36 FoRDH. L.
Rav. 425, 442 (1968); McCarthy, Fair Trial and Prejudicial Publicity: A Need for Re-
form, 17 HsT. L.J. 79, 82 (1965); Note, The American Bar Association Suggests an
Answer to the "Fair Trial-Free Press" Dilemma, 1967 DUKE LJ. 593, 609 n.181;
Note, 45 TtL. L. REv. 1043, 1044 (1971).
5. See note 13 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of other possible
remedies.
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til verdict." Members of the press and general public brought an ac-
tion against the trial judge to compel the opening of the court.7  Held:
Petitioners have no enforceable right to be present at a criminal jury
trial which is closed to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial.8
The right to a public trial, though subject to recognized exceptions,9
is guaranteed by the sixth amendment 0 and is applied to the states
6. As to whether the availability of a transcript fulfills the public trial require-
ment, see Craemer v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193
(1968) (the right of the court to deny the press access to transcript of the proceedings).
Cf. Oxford Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83, 95 (Ct. App. 1968)
(the availability of a transcript at the conclusion of a trial does not satisfy the pub-
lic's interest in securing a public trial).
7. The action was brought under N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAw art. 78 (McKinney 1963).
8. Oliver v. Postel, 37 App. Div. 2d 498, 327 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1971). The time-
lessness of the following observation is an obvious illustration of the historical concern
about the problem of a fair trial:
In these days of newspaper enterprise and universal education, every case of
public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the public at-
tention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can
be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it,
and who has not some impression or some opinion in respect to its merits.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See Radin, The Right to a Public
Trial, 6 TEmp. L.Q. 381 (1932). As to the historical concern with the right to a pub-
lic trial see note 18 infra and accompanying text.
Upon the face of the text of both the first and sixth amendments the problem is
not apparent; however, in the factual context of a pending criminal trial involving a
cause celebre, the conflict is acute. Many such cases reach the Supreme Court for ad-
judication as to whether the extensive publicity precluded the possibility of a fair trial.
See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941). The function of appellate review by the Court was expressed in Penne-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946):
[R]eviewing courts are brought in cases of this type to appraise the com-
ment on a balance between the desirability of free discussion and the neces-
sity for fair adjudication, from free interruption of its processes.
9. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
10. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
In addition to the constitutional guarantee, many state constitutions embody the same
protection. See LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERsrrY,
INDEX DIG=rr OF STATE CONsTrrurmoNS 326 (1950). In New York the guarantee of
a public trial for the criminal defendant is also secured by statute:
N.Y. JUDIciAtyY LAw § 4 (McKinney 1968).
§ 4. Sittings of courts to be public
The sittings of every court within this state shall be public, and every citi-
zen may freely attend the same, except in all proceedings and trials in cases
for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to commit rape,
sodomy, bastardy or filiation, the court may in its discretion, exclude there-
from all persons who are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, wit-
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through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 The
court in Oliver confronted the issue whether the press or public, in ad-
dition to the criminal defendant, can assert the right to a public trial.
The sixth amendment is silent about the interests of the public' 2 in an
open trial, and a division among the courts currently exists.
. Various remedies may be used to minimize the effect of prejudicial
publicity: a jury trial may be waived, a change of venue or a continu-
ance granted, a searching voir dire conducted.' 3 Perhaps the most
effective weapon, the contempt power, can be used only to prevent
"a clear and present danger" to the administration of justice.14
nesses, and officers of the court.
Also the rights secured by the Federal Constitution may be made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bennett v.
Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1970) (sixth amendment right to a public trial).
See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
11. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968).
12. It is established that with regard to the right of the press to compel the open-
ing of the trial, it has no superior right over the general public to attend judicial
proceedings. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1949); Oxnard Pub-
lishing Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1968); Kirstowsky v.
Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956); United Press Ass'ns v.
Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 783 (1954); cf. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton,
100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, 903 (1954).
However, members of the press have alleged that a necessary corollary of the freedom
of the press guaranteed by the first amendment is the right of access to the function-
ings of the branches of government, see Note, Journalistic Media and Fair Trials, 18
CLEV. STATE L. REv. 440, 441 (1968); cf. Note, Right of the Press to Gather Infor-
mation, 71 CoLUM. L. Rav. 838 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see Wright, Fair Trial-
Free Press, 45 F.R.D. 435 (1965); Hudon, Freedom of the Press versus Fair Trial:
The Remedy Lies with the Courts, 1 VALPAPnuso L. RPv. 8 (1966); Jaffe, Trial by
Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 504 (1965); Note, The American Bar Association Sug-
gests an Answer to the "Fair Trial-Free Press" Dilemma, 1967 DuKE L.J. 593;
Note, Procedural Compromise and Contempt: Feasible Alternatives in the Fair Trial
Versus Free Press Controversy, 22 U. FLA. L. Rav. 650 (1970).
14. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). This problem is not new
to legal circles for the debate on the "free press-fair trial" issue has continued for
many years. The debate or conflict is multifaceted and may focus upon the use of
prior restraint to control the press, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Also the issue raised by the petitioners in Oliver is not unique to that case, for it
has been litigated elsewhere. See, e.g., Phoenix Newspaper, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101
Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966); Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745,
300 P.2d 163 (1956). See generally Note, Exclusion of the General Public from a
Criminal Trial-Some Problem Areas, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 458.
The ABA recommendations and those of the states have been the subject of ex-
tensive commentary. See generally Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
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Though courts consistently recognize that open proceedings-in-
cluding criminal trials-are in the public interest, a majority of them
find no constitutional basis for that interest.15 In the face of sup-
Fair Trial vs. A Free Press (Occasional Paper 1965); Cooper, The Rationale for the
ABA Recommendations, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 857 (1967); Douglas, The Press and
First Amendment Rights, 7 IDAo L. REv. 1 (1970); Douglas, The Public Trial and the
Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840 (1960); Fuld, Free Press-Fair Trial Principles and Guide-
lines for the State of New York, 42 N.Y. ST. B.J. 13 (1970); Gard, Free Press v. Fair
Trial: Another Tempest in the Teapot, 54 A.B.A.J. 669 (1968); Jafee, Trial by News-
paper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 504 (1965); Reardon, The Fair Trial-Free Press Standards,
54 A.B.A.J. 343 (1968); Reardon, Fair Trial-Free Press, 52 MARQuETIE L. REv. 547
(1969); Taylor, Crime Reporting and Publicity of Criminal Proceedings, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 34 (1966); Note, Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REv.
838 (1971); Note, The American Bar Association Suggests an Answer to the "Fair
Trial-Free Press" Dilemma, 1967 DuKE L.J. 593; Note, Procedural Compromise and
Contempt: Feasible Alternatives in the Fair Trial Versus Free Press Controversy, 22
U. FLA. L.J. 650 (1970).
15. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 584 (1965) (concurring opinion); Geise v. United
States, 265 F.2d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721,
722 (3d Cir. 1949); United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 81, 123 N.E.2d
777, 785 (1954); People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 61, 123 N.E.2d 769, 770 (1954);
James v. Powell, 51 Misc. 2d 705, 706, 273 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (Sup. Ct. Special Term
1966); New York Licensed Bail Agents' Ass'n v. Murtagh, 200 Misc. 1095, 107 N.Y.S.
2d 380, appeal denied, 303 N.Y. 1009, 106 N.E.2d 284 (1952). See Douglas, Tie
Fair Trial and Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840, 841 (1960); Douglas, The Public Trial
and Free Press, 33 RoCKY MTN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1960); Note, The Accused's Right
to a Public Trial, 42 NortaR DAME LAw. 499, 501 (1967); Note, Free Press and Fair
Trial: An Evolving Controversy, 19 U. FLA. L Rav. 660 (1967).
The Oliver court considered itself bound by the New York Court of Appeals decision
of In re United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954). Valente
was a companion case similar to Oliver in that it was an action brought to compel the
opening of a criminal trial, People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
See 67 HAy. L. REv. 344 (1953); 1 N.Y.L.F. 105 (1954).
The Oliver majority explicitly stated that the Valente decision foreclosed the issue.
Oliver v. Postel, 37 App. Div. 2d 498, 500, 327 N.Y.S.2d 444, 446 (1971).
The dissent argued that the majority's adherence to Valente was erroneous because
of the subsequent applicability of the sixth amendment public trial guarantee to the
states. Although in both cases the concern of the courts was with the New York
statutory provision for a public trial, the effect of the decisions based upon the sixth
amendment might have possibly influenced the Valente court in its interpretation
of the statute. The dissent also argued that the Jelke-Valente situation was factually
distinguishable from Persico-Oliver. Id. at 504, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
The issue presented in Oliver has been considered in other New York cases. See,
e.g., New York v. Hagan, 24 N.Y.2d 395, 248 N.E.2d 588, 300 N.Y.S.2d 835, cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 886 (1969); New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 2 N.Y.2d 677,
143 N.E.2d 256, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1957); People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E.
306 (1931); James v. Powell, 52 Misc.2d 705, 273 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. Special
Term 1966); New York Licensed Bail Agents' Ass'n v. Murtagh, 200 Misc. 1095,
107 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. Special Term 1951).
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portable claims by defendants that their constitutional right to a fair
trial cannot be realized without foregoing the right to an open trial,
those courts have respected defendants' preference for the fair trial.
They have concluded that the public has no right to compel an open
trial, rather the public interest must give way to the defendant's right to
a fair trial.16
The minority view is that the public interest in access to judicial
proceedings is sufficiently important to grant it status as an enforceable
right.17  Creation of the right in the public has been thought necessary
to effectuate at least some of the historical purposes of the constitu-
tional guarantee, i.e., that the public may learn about and have confi-
dence in government processes.' 8  Because there is no right explicitly
granted the public by the Constitution, some minority courts have re-
lied on extra-constitutional considerations to formulate a public "right
to know."' 9
16. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
17. The Oliver dissent favored the majority view:
I interpret this Amendment (the sixth] as requiring the state in a criminal
trial to conduct the trial in a forum open to any member of the public who
wishes to attend.
Oliver v. Postel, 37 App. Div. 498, 504, 327 N.Y.S.2d 444, 451 (1971). See also note
19 infra.
18. See 7 J. WGMORE, EvIDENcE § 1934, at 33 (3d ed. 1940); 31 N.Y.U.L. Rnv.
611 (1956); The reasons for a public trial were succinctly stated in 36 ORE. L. Rnv.
345, 346 (1957):
At present, it is generally agreed that the right to a public trial is supported
by some or all of the following arguments:
(1) Open proceedings improve the quality of testimony, in that the witness is
less likely to testify falsely in the presence of spectators who may stand
ready to expose him.
(2) The presence of the public moves the judge, jury, and counsel to a more
conscientious performance of their duties.
(3) The accused is better able to prove unfair treatment at the hands of the
court if the proceeding is public.
(4) A spectator at the trial may be reminded of some past event he has ob-
served which may be relevant to an issue in the case.
(5) Open proceedings inspire public confidence in the courts.
(6) Persons not directly involved in an action have an opportunity to learn
whether or not the proceedings in that action may have an effect upon their
rights.
19. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 614 (1964) (Stewart dissenting):
The suggestion that there are limits upon the public's right to know what goes
on in the courts causes me great concern. The idea of imposing upon any
medium of communications the burden of justifying its presence is contrary
to where I had always thought the presumption must lie in the area of the
First Amendment freedoms.
A typical judicial statement as to the right of the public is found in United States v.
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Because the addressee of the sixth amendment is "the accused," the
text of the amendment lends support to the majority position. Fur-
ther, it is arguable that substantial control of the right to a public trial
should be vested in the defendant; otherwise its assertion may interfere
with his right to a fair trial °.2  Finally, since judges clearly have dis-
cretion to exclude the public from the courtroom to facilitate the ad-
ministration of justice in other situations, the use of that power here is
neither novel nor drastic.'
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971):
The public has an independent right to be present to see that justice is
fairly done. It is important that our citizens be free to observe court proceed-
ings to insure a sense of confidence in the judicial process. Conducting
trials behind closed doors might endanger an apprehension and distrust of the
legal system which would, in the end destroy its ability to peacefully settle
disputes.
See Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1965):
The right to a public trial is not only to protect the accused but to protect
as much the public's right to know what goes on when men's lives and lib-
erty are at stake, for a secret trial can result in favor as well as prosecution
of a defendant.
Cf. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950); Craig v. Har-
ney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946).
See also United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1949); Davis v. United
States, 247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1917). See generally H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE's
RIGHT To KNow 155-75 (1953); Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q.
381, 392 (1932); Taylor, Crime Reporting and Publicity of Criminal Proceedings, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 34 (1966); Note, The Accused's Right to a Public Trial, 42 NoTRE
DAME LAw. 499 (1967); Note, Exclusion of the General Public from a Criminal Trial-
Some Problem Areas, 1966 WAsH. U.L.Q. 458.
20. United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3d Cir. 1949); 31 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 611, 612 (1956); Note, The Accused's Right to a Public Trial, 42 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 499, 505 (1967). Contra, Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884) (Holmes, J.
quoted in Oliver, 37 App. Div. 2d at 506, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 452):
Though the publication of such proceedings may be to the disadvantage of
the particular individual concerned, yet it is of vast importance to the pub-
lic that the proceedings of courts of justice should be universally known. The
general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public
more than counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose
conduct may be the subject of such proceedings.
21. In many cases the court's authority to exclude certain individuals has been dis-
cussed in relation to the defendant's right to a public trial. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Bruno v.
Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1965); United States v. Sorrentino, 175
F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949); United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949);
Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944); Davis v. United States, 247
F. 394 (8th Cir. 1917); Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1913).
The exclusion of certain members of the public is frequent in cases involving sex
crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Kolbi, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949) (Mann Act
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss3/10
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Although the minority view lacks express constitutional authority,
the "right to know" is arguably within the "penumbra" of express and
implied rights inherent in the Constitution. Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut22 established a right of privacy on
that theory. However, reliance upon Griswold may be misplaced:
there the Court relied upon other, though more general, provisions to
imply a right of privacy.23 It is more difficult to find any analogous
constitutional provisions from which to imply a public "right to
know."24  Further, courts have consistently held that the defendant's
waiver of the right to a public trial does not create a converse right to
a private trial.2 5 The strongest argument for the minority position,
violation); Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944) (adult raped);
Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1913) (rape). The exclusion may
be validly predicated upon the limited ability of the court to physically accommodate
all who wish to be present. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). Another
valid basis for excluding individuals is the effect upon the proceedings brought about
by a spectator's presence or conduct. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold,
408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969) (witness intimidated by spectators); United States ex
rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965) (defendant himself was disruptive);
Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394 (8th Cir. 1917) (relatives of defendant had a
fight with witness); State v. Mancini, - R.I. -, 274 A.2d 742 (1971) (spectators
intimidated the witness). Sometimes the order of exclusion issued by the court allows
the relatives of the defendant, or any parties the defendant selects, to remain in the
courtroom. Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394 (8th Cir. 1917) (relatives of the de-
fendant remained); People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 6 N.Y.S 756 (1900) (court al-
lowed defendant to select persons he wanted to remain).
In consideration of all of the above, a viable definition of a public trial was tendered
by Chief Justice Warren in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 584 (1965):
[A] trial is public in the constitutional sense, when a courtroom has facilities
for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, which facil-
ities are not so small as to render the openness negligible and not so large
as to distract the trial participants from their proper function, when the pub-
lic is free to use those facilities, and when those who attend the trial are
free to report what they observed at the proceedings.
22. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Id. at 484.
24. But see Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950);
Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1965); Brief for Appellant at 31, Oliver v.
Postel, 37 App. Div. 2d 498, 327 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1971); Warren, Free Press-Fair Trial:
The "Gag Order" A California Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 51, 78 (1972).
25. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965); United States v. American Radiator
& Standard San. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Schavey v. Roylston, 8 Ariz.
App. 574, 448 P.2d 418 (1968); Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 83 (Ct. App. 1968); Cox v. State, 3 Md. App. 173, 238 A.2d 157 (1968);
E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896, appeal dismissed,
163 Ohio St. 261, 130 N.E.2d 701 (1955). The fallaciousness of the existence of
converse rights is presented by analogy in Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal.
586
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however, appears to be that in a democratic society the public should
be able to observe the manner in which their judicial system func-
tions.
Even though the clash between the defendant's right to a fair
trial and the public's right to compel a public trial may not be of consti-
tutional magnitude, courts must deal with the problem of prejudicial
publicity. The "clear and present danger" doctrine limits use of the
contempt power. A change of venue, and for the most part, voir dire,
only alleviate the effect of pre-trial publicity, while sequestering the
jury or closing the courtroom are only useful once the trial has begun.
Since an unsequestered jury may still be subject to publicity based up-
on information gathered outside the courtroom, the trial judge, with-
out interfering with public access to the courtroom, could have more
effectively handled the problem in the instant case by sequestering the
jury.
App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956) (quoted by the dissent in Oliver, 37 App. Div. 2d
at 505, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 453).
26. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948); E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100
Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (Ohio App. 1965); State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224
P.2d 500 (1950) (dictum); 20 HAv. L. Rav. 489 (1907). See also note 18 supra and
accompanying text.
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